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SOME CHANGING PATTERNS IN THE LEGAL ORDER
BY F. R. AuAzNN*
The period we are passing through is a transitional one.
On every side there is a vast confusion as attempts are made to
find solutions for the difficult problems forced upon us by
technological change. "History", says Mr. Stuart Chase, "is
at one of its momentous passages"1 In the political sphere,
centralization of power proceeds apace, with dictatorships, one
after another, superseding parliaments and checks and balances.
In the legal sphere, a spirit of change raises new problems for
law and law administration. Whether this movement will sup-
plement or modify, revolutionize or transform, no one can say.
That it is a ferment of no ordinary character, few will deny.
On the contrary, many competent observers believe it is a period
of major significance.2 Dean Pound, one of our foremost
students of jurisprudence, sees it as one of those great periodic
swings back to justice without law, comparable to the movement
* A. B., Ohio Wesleyan, 1921; Western Reserve Law School 1923-24;
A. M., Ohio State, 1925; Ph. D., Iowa, 1920; Instructor in Political
Science at Ohio State.
I"The Age of Plenty, and the Imperatives Which It Involves,"
Harper's Magazine, March, 1934.
"In the middle of the sixteenth century, lawyers began to com-
plain that the common law was being set aside and that scarcely any
business of importance came to the king's courts of law. In the reign
of Queen Mary, an observer wrote that the common-law lawyers had
little to do but look about them." (Maitland, English Law and the
Renaissance, 82 N. 52.) At this time, Maitland tells us, "in criminal
cases that were of any political importance, an examination by two
or three doctors of the civil law threatened to become a normal part
of our proceddure." (Id. 22.) For three hundred years the growing
point of law had been in the king's courts of common law. As far back
as the reign of Edward III, they had enforced the doctrine of the
supremacy of law upon the collection of the king's taxes (Y. B. Mich.
12 E. 3, No. 23, 1338), and had made clear to the king that he could
not interfere by private letter with the due course of justice (Reginald
De Nerford's Case, Y. B. Hil. 14 E. 3, No. 54, 1339-40), and more recently
they had laid down that even parliament could not make a king a
person. (Prior of Castleacre's Case, Y. B. 21 H. 7, 1506.) In Tudor,
England, this growth stopped for a season. For a time, the growing
point of law was in quite another type of tribunal than the courts of
common law. That was the age of King's Council, of the Star Chamber,
of the Court of Requests, of courts of a Roman, and, what was more
important, a summary procedure. The movement away from the
common law was a movement from judicial justice administered in
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'which brought equity into English law, or into Roman law as
well.3 "We are now in fact", says Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson,
"in the bursting time of one of law's long, slow, but greatly
glorious springs. I look for a great flowering.'' 4  There are
several phases of this movement. One phase involves a new
approach to thought about law and its place in society. Some
speak of this movement as "a scientific approach to law"; others
as "the skeptical movement", or the "neo-realist" movement;
while still others describe it as "the functional approach"
which stresses the interest in, and valuation, by effects. The
"objective method" and "fact-research" are looked upon as
having an important place in this movement and interest in the
actuality of what happens is emphasized, and district of formula
is expressed. Although the individuals who have taken part in
this movement differ somewhat in point of view, in interest, and
in emphasis, certain points of departure seem common to all.5
Accompanying this realistic movement in jurisprudence is
a tendency to put a new emphasis on the role and importance of
administrative tribunals or by administrative officers. In other words,
it was a reaction from justice according to law to justice without
law, and in this respect again the present movement away from the
common law court is parallel." (Pound, "Justice According to Law,"
Oolumbia Law Review, Vol. 13-14, pp. 696-713.)
3 "Equity both at Rome and in England began as executive justice.
The executive justice of today is esentially of the same nature. It Is
an attempt to adjust the relations of Individuals with each other and
with the state summarily, largely according to the notions of an
executive officer for the time being as to what the general interest
and a square deal demand, unencumbered by many rules. The fact
that it Is largely justice without law is what commends it to a busy
and strenous age, as it was what commended it to the individualism
of an England set to thinking freely and vigorously by Renaissance
and Reformation. Moreover, the causes of each movement away from
the common law courts and hence from the law are much the same.
In each of the partial reversions to justice without law referred to,
it happened that for the time being the law was not fulfilling its end.
It was not adjusting the relations of individuals with each other so
as to accord with the moral sense of the community. Hence praetor
or emperor or king or chancellor administered justice for a season
without law till a new and more liberal system of rules developed. In
part a similar situation may be remarked today. The world over a
shifting of ideas as to the end of the law and the meaning of justice
is putting a heavy pressure upon the administration of justice
secondary to law." Pound, "Justice According to Law," Columbia Law
Review, Vols. 13-14, pp. 696-713.
"'Judging as Administration," The Amer ican Law School Review,
No. 11, April, 1934, p. 1071.
'Karl Llewellyn believes any such common approach would in-
volve: "(1) The conception of law In flux, of moving law, and of
judicial creation of law; (2) the conception of law as a means to
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the judge in orienting law to life.6 In this view it is the duty
of the judge to administer law, "not merely possessively, but
dynamically and actively"; adapting the law to changing social
needs7 so far as possible through the judicial process; and where
the law is lacking anywhere and beyond the judicial power of
social ends and not an end in itself; so that any part needs constantly
to be examined for its purpose, and for its effect and to be judged in
the light of both and of their relation to each other; (3) the concep-
tion of society in flux, and a flux typically faster than the law, so that
the probability is that any portion of law needs re-examination to
determine how far it fits the society it purports to serve; (4) the
temporary disregarding of the question of what the courts ought to
do, while .ngaged in the study of what the courts are doing; (5) dis-
trust of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they purport to
describe what courts or people are actually doing; (6) distrust of the
theory that prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative
factors in producing court decisions (This involves the tentative adop-
tion of the theory of rationalization for the study of opinions); (7) the
belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases and legal situations
into narrower categories than has been the practice in the past; (8) an
insistence on evaluation of any part of the law in terms of its effects;
(9) insistence on sustained and programmatic attack on the problems
of law along any of these lines." "Some Realism About Realism-
Responding to Dean Pound," Harvard Law Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 8,
June, 1931.
6 "In such times judging is administration, and the actual and
the ideal draw close in the law. When I say then, that there is noth-
ing modern in what I am to say, this must be taken as true only
in a restricted sense. Though the idea that judging is the administra-
tion of justice according to law is very old, there is, in the acute
awareness of today of the need for, and the meaning of a f'unctional
approach in judging as in everything a real modernism. (Italics mine.)
"The Worm Turns," Illinois Law Review, Vol. 27, p. 357; Stone, "Some
Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification," 23 Columbia Law Re-
view, 319-332. Wigmore's inimitable critique on judges and their ways,
5 Wigmore, Evidence (Id. Ed. 1915), Preface to Supplement Index."
Judge Joseph G. Hutcheson, Jr., "Judging as Administration," The
American Law School Review, Vol. 7, No. 11, April, 1934, p. 1071.
"Now it is commonplace to say that the functional approach of
the judge to his work in administering justice Is perhaps more im-
portant than the methodic; that in short a judge must in discharging
the great office to which he is called, conceive his function in dynamic
terms. Everywhere people are inquiring, what are you dding, in order
to know why are you doing it. Everywhere the predicate is being
laid for more and better administration; pragmatic idealists, Idealistic
pragmatists, are abroad in the law. They want to know if what you
are doing is working well. If not, why not scrap it. (Functionalism
means thinking of effort in terms of what It Is intended to accomplish
rather than what it is. This is where pure description fails. It sees
a thing or an effort as it Is going rather than as it ought to be or
ought to go or to be or do the thing we want. This is the key to the
new direction of effort; to look at intended results and to survey all
the possible means for their accomplishment regardless of the means
which happen to be in use. For it may very likely be that present
means have been arrived at In some haphazard and, rule of thumb
fashion rather than by an effort of genuine analysis." Tugwell, The
Industrial Discipline.) It is almost as if there were a great wind
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repair, to co-operate with judicial councils and their agencies in
getting change through other channels.8
Emphasis on a conscious recognition of the factor of social
control in the judging process is greatly favored by the realists.
It has some interesting sidelights. 9 It is in line with the prag-
matic philosophy now so widely accepted.1 0
In emphasizing the factor of control the realists do not deny
that "purpose has always been an inescapable factor in deter-
mining what shall be enforced as law" but stress the point that
the adaptation of means to an end ought to be self-conscious
and methodical, a recognized part of the jurists' problem."
blowing, throwing open the shutters of our minds, dashing down old
signs pointing tabu there, and having opened the closed and dark
places, already sweeping the dust and rubbish gathered there." Judge
Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., ibid., p. 1071.
8 F. R. Aumann, "The Ohio Judicial Council Embarks on a Survey
of Justice," American Political Science Review, May, 1930, Vol. XXIV,
pp. 416-425; IF. R. Aumann, "The Judicial Council Movement and
Iowa," Iowa Law Review, June, 1930, Vol. XV, pp. 425-433: F. R.
Aumann, "The Ohio Judicial Council: Studies and Reports," American
Political Science Review, December, 1933, Vol. XXVII, pp. 957-964.
'Walter W. Cook, "Scientific Method and the Law," 13 American
Bar Association Journal, 303 ff. (1927); Herman Oliphant, "A Return
to Stare Decisis," 14 Amercian Bar Association Journal, 71 ff. (1928).10 "As a point of view, pragmatism may perhaps be most described
as an effort to take fully to heart the lesson of evolution, first as it
appeared in the work of Darwin, and then as a way of looking at all
sorts of social phenomena. Darwin's work was epoch-making in the
history of thought, because it was the first scientific achievement, on
a vast scale, along the lines of a purely empirical method such as
English philosophy from the days of Francis Bacon had loved to em-
phasize, namely the ordering of a great mass of seemingly unrelated
data without the clue of mathematics. But the results of evolution
radically changed the pre-Darwinian picture of nature and of human
thought. It suggested a process of endless change, without fixed ends,
in which the course of change, could be plotted only for limited in-
tervals and in terms of casual relations having a rather limited span.
It swept away the whole apparatus of fixed categories of explanation
such as the species of pre-Darwinian biology, and reduced the so-called
self-evident and a priori principles upon which both science and
philosophy had been supposed to rest to the level of "provisional"
rules. And if one asked "Provisional for what?" a generation that had
learned of Darwin could only answer "Provisional for human action."
Thus it became natural to picture thought as a factor in behaviour,
significant for what it effectively does in modifying the habitual
adaptation of men to the conditions of their life. Thus philosophic
pragmatism may be said to stand like a tripod upon the three sup-
ports of empiricism, evolution, and the instrumentalism of thought in
human behaviour. It accepts control as the end of knowledge and
the test of its efficacy, and therefore makes purpose an ineradicable
part of all thinking." Geo. H. Sabine, "The Pragmatic Approach to
Politics," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 24, November,
1930, p. 866.
n"The object of the law is to regulate conduct for some end, and
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Closely related to this tendency to give the judge an in-
creased or re-emphasized responsibility' 2 in the sphere of con-
scious renovation, or judicial legislation, or judicial restatement
of the law is a perceptible change of judicial attitude toward
the function of precedent in our system. At the present time
there are many indications that the doctrine of "stare decisis"
is undergoing a marked decline in its influence and practical
application in this country.13 Tls tendency14 has been notice-
the end sought is the only criterion by which to decide what similari-
ties are essential and what are not. The ruling consideration in mak-
ing the choice ought to be the desirability of the practical results
which will follow. Consequently, the jurist ought not to try to
escape the consideration of ends and the means of obtaining them,
but should make such matters consciously and overtly a part of his
study of the law. As I understand Professors Cook and Oliphant, they
mean to assert that some choice of public policy cannot practically be
avoided by judges and students of the law. The objection is not that
judges fail to do this, but that they do it confusedly, or ignorantly,
and therefore without a full sense of responsibility for what they are
doing. By setting up the fiction that cases themselves contain the
principles for their own classification, they really become the victims
of their own preconceptions. There is no system of formal legal logic
by which cases can validly be decided, and the pretense that decisions
are made in this way merely encourages clandestine ways of making
them." Geo. H. Sabine, "The Pragmatic Approach to Politics," Amer-
ican Political Science Review, Vol. 24, November, 1930, pp. 876-878.
'2"Just as -when communities go religiously dead, and revivals
sweep over them to make religion live again there, the religion when
it comes is in spirit though not in form, the same old religion, so
ever recurring these stirrings in the law are not new; they are re-
vivals, for the whole truth of the matter Is that in method law is
ever changing. The function of its administrators to do justice is ever
constant. What strictures and prevents the actual from growing ever
toward the ideal in the law, is administrative lack. Because of this
lack, form is taken for substance. Method becomes more important
than function. Predictability, certainty and fixity of line, rule and
precept in the law cease to be elements of, they become, law, tran-
scending all other elements in it, standing for the time for justice
itself. As the law crystallizes under this treatment, its ministers, the
judges become administrators less and less, oracles, more and more.
Then, in periods of change and revival, the administrator appears
again. Greatly conscious of his function he tumbles down the pent
house in which formalism has confined the law, and working some-
times with old straw, sometimes with new, sometimes without straw
at all, he lifts the temples of the law higher toward the Heavens,
where long enough housed, its administrators cease again to be ad-
ministrators, become again diviners, patterers, soothsayers, lever
shifters of legal slot machines." Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., ibid.,
p. 1070.
23There does not seem to be such a trend in England. Justice
Cardozo in comparing the position of the doctrine in this country and
England said: "The House of Lords holds Itself absolutely bound by
its own prior decisions." (Gray, supra, Sec. 462; Salmond, Jurisprt-
dense, p. 164, Sec. 64; Pound, "Juristic Science and the Law," 31
Harvard Law Review, 1053; London. St. Tramways (o. v. London
County Council, 1898, A. C. 375, 379.) The United Staten Supreme
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able for some time. 5 It reflects, in some instances, a desire for
a mild modification of the doctrine ;16 and in other cases a dis-
position to completely abandon it. 17 Among those interested
in reappraising the older view toward stare decisis are members
of the Supreme Court of the United States,' 8 of Kansas,19
Ohio,20 and New York.2 ' A number of distinguished legal
Court and the highest court of the several states overrule their own
prior decisions when manifestly erroneous. (Pollock, First Book of
Jurisprudence, pp. 319, 320; Gray, "Judicial Precedents," 9 Harvard
Law Review, 27, 400.) Pollock in a paper entitled, "The Science of
Case Law," written more than fifty years ago, spoke of the freedom
with which this was done, as suggesting that the law was nothing
more than a matter of individual opinion. (Essays in Jurisprudence
and Ethics, p. 245.) Since then the tendency has If anything increased.
-- Cardozo, "The Nature of the Judicial Process," p. 158. Arthur L.
Goodhart gives a very reasonable explanation as to why the doctrine
of "Stare Decisis" is losing prestige in this country and not in Eng-
land. "Case Law in England and America," Cornell Law Quarterly,
Vol. 15, Feb., 1930, pp. 189 ff.
""In such matters we can only speak of averages, of tendencies.
And it Is, I think, safe to say that in most American jurisdictions
today a more rational theory as to the binding force of precedents
generally obtains than that held by the British House of Lords. The
better class of modern lawyers and judges have in part from the very
copiousness of authority come to regard precedent as their servant
and not their master as presumptive evidence of what law is rather
than as absolutely conclusive evidence."--Orin McMurray, "Changing
Conceptions of Law" (1915), Calif. L. R. 441, 446.
In Washington v. Dawson and Co., 264 U. S. 21, 238, 44 Sup. Ct.
304, 309 (1904), Mr. Justice Brandeis cites twelve instances in which
the Supreme Court has reversed itself.
"Judge Cardozo says: "I think adherence to precedents should
be the rule and not the exception . . . But I am ready to concede
that the rule of adherence to precedent, though it ought not to be
abandoned, ought to be in some degree relaxed . . . There should
be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule
to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined
the conduct of the litigants and particularly when in its origin it was
the product of institutions or conditions which have gained a new
significance or development with the progress of the years."--Benjamin
Cardozo, "The Nature of the Judicial Process" (1921), pp. 149, 150, 151.
iTProfessor Herman Oliphant takes a very advanced position in
the matter. "Not the judges' opinions, but which way they decide
cases will be the dominant subject-matter of any truly scientific study
of law. This Is the field of scholarly work worthy of best talents, for
the work to be done Is not the study of vague and shifting rationaliza-
tions, but the study of such tough things as the accumulated wisdom
of men taught by immediate experiences in contemporary life,--the
battered experiences of judges among brutal facts."--"A Return to
Stare Decisis," 14 A. B. A. J. 71, 159 (1928).
" See statements by Justices Lurton and Clark in Hertz v. Wood-
man [218 U. S. 205, 212, 30 Sup. Ct. 621 (1910)], and Rosen v. United
States [245 U. S. 465, 471, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, 150 (1918)].
9Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kansas, 625.
"Adams Express Co. v. Beckith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 351f 352, 126
N. B. 300, 301 (1919).
I Oppenhel, v. Zridel, 236 N. Y. 156, 165, 140 N. E. 227, 230, 1923.
XL L. .- 4
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scholars, including Roscoe Pound,2 2 Henry H. Wigmore, 23
Leon Green. 24 Orin MeMurray,2 5 and Harlan Stone,2 6 have also
concerned themselves with this problem. Some of these men
insist that the day will come when precedents, and especially the
precedent of .a single case, will no longer be considered a bind-
ing source of law which judges must accept under all circum-
stances.27 'Whether the movement goes that far or not, the
tendency to relax the force of precedent is bound to give the
judge a larger role in determining what the law is which shall
be applied. 28 The ultimate outcome of this trend is difficult to
predict. In some quarters it is said that the final result will be
a condition approximating the civil law.2 9 There are several
2 "Law in Books and Law in Action" (1904), 44 Am. L. Rev. 12,
20; "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Gol. L. Rev., pp. 605, 614 (1908);
"The Theory of Judicial Decision" (1923), 36Harvard Law Rev.
940-943.
2Problems of Law (1920), 79.
""The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases" (1928), 28 Gol. L. Rev.
1014, 1036.
21"Changing Conceptions of Law" (1915), Galif. L. Rev. 441, 446.
26"Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification" (1923), 23
Gol. L. R. 319, 320.
S"Precedents, and especially the precedent of a single case, will
no longer be considered a binding source of law which judges must
accept under all circumstances. Only if decided cases have created a
practice upon which laymen have relied will the American courts feel
that they are bound to follow them. This, as I have attempted to show,
is the doctrine of the civil law and directly contrary to that of the
English law with its insistence upon the need for certainty. I there-
fore believe that, as concerns the fundamental doctrine of precedent,
English and American law are at the parting of the ways."-Goodhart,
Essays in Jurisprudence and the Gom mon Law, p. 74.
2 Under the present system our judges have a difficult time in ad-
justing the law to the rapidly changing social and economic conditions
of the country. "Where a rule has once been decided, even though
wrongly, it is difficult or impossible to depart from it. I do not agree
with those who think that flexibility is a characteristic of case law.
The binding force of precedent is a fetter on the discretion of the
judge; but for precedent he would have a much freer hand."-Geldart,
Elements of English Law, p. 28.
. "It is, I think, therefore safe to say that the present American
doctrine Is strongly away from the strict English doctrine of 'stare
decisis.: But is this merely a temporary step to be followed by the
reaction which so frequently succeeds legal innovations, or is it likely
to be accentuated in the future? I believe that the latter Is the fact,
and that in no distant time the American doctrine will approximate
the civil law. This will be due In large part to five reasons: (a) the
uncontrollable flood of American decisions, (b) the predominant posi-
tion of constitutional questions in American law, (c) the American
need for flexibility in legal development, (d) the method of teaching
in the American law schools, and (e) the restatement of the law by
the American Law Institute."-Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence and
the Gommon Law, p. 65.
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practical factors which might bring about such a result. For
one thing, there is a growing demand for speedy settlement of
cases. At the same time the -volume of judicial business has
continued to increase rapidly.3 0  With this increase has come
an expansion of case law.31 In bulk it has now become almost
unmanageable.3 2 Some method of control must be devised.83
Although there is some evidence that the courts are trying to
limit their written opinions, the problem remains unsolved.3 4
As long as we continue to maintain what Morris Cohen calls
"the phonographic theory of the judicial function" little prog-
ress can be hoped for in cutting through this wilderness.
Whether the movement to modify stare cdecisis will reach
the condition of the Civil Law is doubtful. 5 Such a move
"o"All available figures show consistent and large growth in the
amount of litigation." See General Trends in Volume of Business,
Recent Social Trends in the United States, Vol. 2 (1933), pp. 1450-1453.
81 "Each year about 350 volumes of reports are being published,
which can be compared with the five or six volumes for all of England
and Wales. As far back as 1902 the President of the American Bar
Association, in his annual address to the Association (cited by Whitney,
'The Doctrine of Stare Decisis,' Michigan Law Review, 1904, Vol. III,
N. 40, at p. 97), stated that the law reports of the past year contained
262,000 pages and estimated that a man by reading 100 pages a day
might go through them in eight years; by which time there would be
new reports on hand sufficient to occupy him for 56 years more."
Goodhart, Essays in .Turisprudence and the Common Law (1931), p. 65.
$"As to rulings of courts, it is estimated that in America alone
there are a million and a half reported decisions available as judicial
precedents; and the increase each year represents 170,000 printed
pages. (Root, Elihu, address to American Law Institute, Proceedings,
1923, I, p. 49; John Hopkins University, The Institute for the Study of
Law, Circular, 1929, No. 7, p. 10; Y. B. Smith, Education and Research,
New York State Bar Association Bulletin, 1930, pp. 189, 190.)
uRecent Social Trends in the United States, Vol. 2 (1933), p. 1430;
see also Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 1924, p. 4, "Unless courts set
some restraints on the length and number of published opinions, it is
inevitable that our present system of making the law reports the chief
repertory of the unwritten law will break down of its own weight."
"For the percentage of cases where written opinions were reduced
in U. S. Supreme Court and New York Court of Appeals, see Rosbrook,
"The Art of Judicial Reporting," Cornell Law Quarterly, 1925, Vol. 10,p. 103.' The European view Is that the disadvantage of following an out-
worn precedent or one which was wrong from the first is much
greater than the occasional inconvenience or injustice which may re-
sult from disregarding it. In their opinion, the development of the
law should proceed along the lines of rational principles and abstract
justice rather than upon the strict rule of "stare decisis." Referring
to the case system as "la superstition du cas", the European turns
with confidence to the methods of the Civil Law. See Kotze, Judicial
Precedent (1918), Law Times, 349. There will always be differences
of opinion and practice In this matter, it would seem. In Dicey, Law
and Public Opinion in England (1905), pp. 393 ff., there is a discussion
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would involve a fundamental departure from Anglo-Saxon legal
principles.s" For some time, however, our judges will ap-
parently have a much freer hand in determining the law. For
not only will they be les. fettered by precedents, but they will
be encouraged by the power-begetting philosophy of the "func-
tionalists".
If legal history repeats itself,3 7 the scope of judicial law-
making will be greatly widened by these factors. In the past
whenever it became necessary to bring the administration of
justice into touch with new moral ideas, or changed social or
political conditions, great emphasis has been placed on a wide
of both sides of this question. See also Democracy in America, Vol. 2,
Ch. 16, in which De Toequeville criticizes American lawyers for in-
vestigating what has been done rather than what might be done; and
for engaging in the pursuit of precedent rather than reason.
3A number of writers have asserted that the distinction between
the civilian and common law systems is greater in theory than in
practice. Thomas Erskine Holland is one writer who has taken this
view. In his volume on Jurisprudence (13th ed. 1924), p. 70, he says:
"There have been of late symptoms of approximation between the two
theories." Dean Pound has made a similar expression. He says: "In
fact, our practice and the practice of the Roman-law world are not so
far apart as legal, theory makes them seem." "The Theory of the
Judicial System," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 36 (1923), p. 646. Judge
Robert L. Henry of the Mixed Tribunals of Egypt, who has had a wide
experience with the Common Law system in the United States before
taking up his duties under the Civil Law does not agree with this
view, however. He says: "But from my experience in the actual ap-
plication of the Civil Law, including, of course, my observation of the
work of counsel before the court, I have come to the conclusion that
such indices may be misleading. It is clear that the divergence in
attitude as to precedents between the Civil Law and the Common Law
is still great, and that there is little likelihood of its becoming sub-
stantially less for a long time to come." Henry, Jurisprudence Con-
stante and Stare Decisis (1929), American Bar Association Journal,
Vol. 15, p. 11.
I"For the most part, the administration of justice has swung
back and forth from an extreme reliance upon the one to a no less
extreme reliance upon the other. In the strict law of the later Middle
Ages in England, and in the maturity of American law in the last
half of the nineteenth century, the stress was put upon rules. Attempt
was made to exclude all individualization, and to confine the mag-
istrate to strict observance of minute and detailed precepts, or to a
mechanical process of application of law through logical deduction
from fixed principles. On the other hand, in the administrative tri-
bunals of sixteenth and seventeenth century England, in the executive
and legislative justice of the American colonies, and in administrative
boards and commissions which have been set up so lavishly in the
present century, the stress is put upon discretion and individualization.
Here, in contrast, a wide power is given to the magistrate to fit the
action of the tribunal to the facts of an individual case. But already
some reaction from this administrative justice is manifest. Apparently
the mechanical action of legal rules may be tempered, but we may not
hope to obviate it." Pound, Criminal Justice in America, p. 39.
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judicial discretion.3 s  Gradualy the ideas introduced into the
law in those periods of change results in a new body of set rules.
As time passes, the method of exercising discretion hardens and
the course of judicial action becomes uniform once again.
Eventually an extreme of detailed rule, rigidly applied, replaces
the extreme of judicial freedom.3 9 Apparently any attempt to
depend exclusively upon wide judicial discretion, on the one
hand, or strict confinement of the magistrate by fixed rules, upon
the other, is doomed to failure.4 0 Despite the fact that neither
method in its unlimited form can endure for long,41 such at-
tempts have been made repeatedly and persistently.
If we were to pause at this point we would have noted in
the legal field today a new approach, functional in character,
which is greatly concerned with the role played by law in
society; we would have noted also, that in this period of rapid
social change we are repeating ancient legal patterns by widen-
ing the sphere of judicial discretion to the end that law may be
more easily adjusted to new social needs. If we stopped here,
we would have failed to note some remarkable changes which
have taken place, in the legal field, particularly from the stand-
point of organization and- procedure.
Of prime importance in this connection is the movement
which is well under way to modify our traditional litigative
3
8 Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law (1904), pp. 107-138.
w Roscoe Pound, "The Decadence of Equity," 5 Col. Law Rev. 20.
" . .the most constant and universal cause of dissatisfac-
tion with law grows out of the mechanical operations of legal rules.
A balance between rules of law and magisterial discretion, which will
give effect both to the general security and the individual life, is
perhaps the most difficu7t problem of law." Roscoe Pound, Criminal
Justice in America, p. 38.
"I "Each has its advantages and disadvantages. The application
of an unvarying rule is. due to work hardship in particular cases,
and the more general the rule the greater the possibility becomes.
On the other hand an unvarying rule has the great merit of certainty.
In discussions of the evil of the law, attention is often directed too
exclusively to the problems of the just settlement of litigation; since
the great triumph of a system of law is that justice is thereby attained
in the vast majority of cases without litigation. If the rules governing
rights and duties regarding persons and property are certain, there is
less opportunity for dispute. It is this advantage together with the
preference that men have to be subjected to the unbridled will of one
of their fellow creatures that made it one of the great ambitions of
our forefathers to create a government of laws and not of men. But
those who choose this method must recognize that it will bring certain
hardship with it." Samuel Williston, Some Modern Tendencies in the
Law (1925), pp. 1-2.
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method of settling controversies;42 and established boards and
commissions 43 to handle work formerly performed exclusively
by the courts.44 During the past twenty years this movement
has made steady advances. 45  Nor is the end in sight.46  The
public sees delay, expense, and technicality in the courts of gen-
eral jurisdietion.47 It is interested in speedy settlement, final-
2Implicit in this movement is a desire to make our law and legal
machinery more responsive to present social needs. Giving impetus
to this movement are a number of reform groups concerned with some
particular phase of the legal problem. For example, the American
Judicature Society is working for unified and specialized courts and
emphasizes the need for getting away from antiquated rules of pro-
cedure; the American Institute of Criminology is working for the
individual treatment of criminal cases; the National Association of
Legal Aid Societies is working for an adequate defense for defendants
who are unable to pay the costs under the present system; the Amer-
ican Arbitration Society is in favor of a less formal method of settling
disputes with lawyers largely displaced; and the American Law In-
stitute is working on a restatement of the law with a view to clarify-
ing it.
"W. F. Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration (1929),
Ch. 3; F. R. Aumann, "The Changing Relationship of the Executive
and Judicial Branches," Kentucky Law Journal (1934), Vol. XXII,
pp. 246-260.
""There Is a special field of law development," says Elihu Root,
"which has manifestly become inevitable. We are entering upon the
creation of a body of administrative law quite different in its ma-
chinery, its remedies and its necessary safeguards from the old
methods of regulation by specific statutes by the courts. As any com-
munity passes from simple( to complex conditions the only way In
which the government can deal with the-increased burden thrown
upon it is by the delegation of power to be exercised In detail by
subordinate agencies, subject to the control of general directions pre-
sented by superior authority. The necessities of our situation have
already led to an extensive employment of this method." Report,
American Bar Association, 1916, pp. 368-369.
"Roscoe Pound, "The Growth of Administrative Justice," Wiscon-
sin Law Review, Vol. II, p. 321 (1924). "None were compelled to state
the most important experiment in the administration of justice made
in the twentieth century; the answer would unhesitatingly be the
attempt to secure justice through administrative courts. Such tribunals
have sprung up with amazing rapidity; they have taken over an
enormous amount of litigation formerly handled by the courts, and
the law concerning administrative justice is the most rapidly growing
branch of the law in our entire jurisprudence." R. H. Smith, Justice
and the Poor (1919), p. 83. Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of
the Supreme Court (1929), pp. 184-186.
4"Elihu Root believes that there will be no withdrawal from these
experiments. "We shall expand them," he says, "whether we approve
theoretically or not, because such agencies furnish protection to rights
and obstacles to wrong-doing, which, under our new social and in-
dustrial conditions, cannot be practically accomplished by the old
and simple procedures of legislatures, and courts as in the last genera-
tion." Report, American Bar Association, 1916, pp. 368-369.
•"A court is at the best an expensive institution. Its methods of
procedure are formal and technical. It can only handle matters
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ity and freedom from procedural contentions. In consequence,
it experiments with new agencies and will probably continue
to do so, if administrative adjudication proves satisfactory over
a period of time.
The final result of this movement remains a matter of
some doubt.48 The immediate effect is to raise anew for our
law, after three centuries, the problem of executive justice.49
Despite its challenge to the doctrine of the "supremacy of the
law" 50 which has been so long considered as central to our
brought before it. It does not act upon its own initiative. In the de-
termining of facts it has no technically trained staff of its own. The
proceeding is in the nature of a duel between the parties, and almost
its only method of determining facts is by the cumbersome and ex-
pensive question-and-answer device. More fundamental still the burden
of inquiry is in large part thrown upon private individuals. In marked
contrast with this, administrative agencies can act on their own
initiative, assume responsibility for determining facts, and have ex-
pert staffs to do the work of investigating. They are not bound by
formal rules of evidence and procedures as are courts, and they
generally can and do act in a more direct, efficient and economical
manner, and with much greater dispatch." W. F. Willoughby, Prin-
ofple8 of Judicial Administration (1929), pp. 20-21.
4 "The future development of this type of administrative tribunal
perplexes all jurists. It is undoubtedly true that some of its present
advantages are due to the fact that it occupies an extra-legal position
(Pound, "Organization of Courts," American Judicature Society, Bulle-
tin 6, page 4), and that temporarily it escapes from the limitations of
justice according to law and judicial justice. It is closely analogous
to the rise of equity (Ibid. 5) with the exception that instead of en-
trusting justice to priests in place of judges, our recourse has been
to laymen. New agencies enjoy a sort of hiatus when rules and prec-
edents are few, when the liberalizing spirit is strong, but this is
transitory. (Pound, Justice According to Law, p. II.) It is certain
that the administrative tribunals must ascertain and administer their
justice according to law and it is likely that they will ultimately be-
come part of the regular judicial system." (Ibid., p. 42; "Report of
Dean Pound to the President of Harvard University for 1915-1916,
p. 2.) R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor, p. 91.
,,That government officials should assume the traditional func-
tions of courts of law, and be permitted to determine the rights of
individuals, is a development so out of line with the path of our
legal growth as to challenge certain underlying principles of our
Jurisprudence. (See Hon. Geo. Sutherland, "President's Address, Amer-
ican Bar Association," Reports, American Bar Assoc. (1917'), XLII,
204 ff.; Hon. Wm. D. Guthrie, "President's Address, New York State
Bar Association," Reports, N. Y. State Bar Assoc. (1923), XLVI,
175 ff.); John Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy
of the Law in the United States (1927), p. 3.
" Anglo-Saxon legal theory has placed great emphasis on the
doctrine of individual rights and has assumed that such rights could
only be adequately protected by the courts. It also places great em-
phasis on the independence of the courts. All legal controversies,
according to this doctrine, should be decided by the ordinary judicial
courts which should be supreme in such matters. Any notion of ad-
ministrative jurisdiction such as is known and practiced on the Con-
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legal tradition, administrative adjudication would seem to b
here to stay.5' In any event, we are not likely to return to the
conditions of tlxe nineteenth century when a growing adminis-
trative need was paralyzed by our American exaggeration of
the common-law doctrine of supremacy of law.52- Some changes
tinent of Europe would be inconsistent with this theory. There Is in
Anglo-Saxon legal theory one law and one court for the citizen and
public functionary alike. A right to sue the state is not admitted
except where it Is expressly conferred by statute, hand when it is
conferred it is usually subject to restrictions which frequently make
the action difficult. [See A. V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution (2nd ed.),
lecture 5; and his article "The Droit Administratif in Modern French
Law," Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 17 (1901), pp. 302 ff.). The system
of administrative law and jurisdiction found in European countries
has been criticized by commentators trained in Anglo-Saxon legal
theory, as a system which Is fundamentally wrong because it is based
on the principle of inequality between the official class and the body
of private citizens. (See A. Lawrence Lowell, Governments and Parties
in Europe, Vol. 1, p. 58; compare with later view in Government of
England, Vol. 2, p. 503.) This criticism is not convincing to some ob-
servers. [See defense of the administrative law by Professor J. H.
Morgan in his Introduction to Robinson's Public Authorities and Legal
Liability (1925), pp. 61 ff.] Professor Morgan contends that the indi-
vidual in France and Germany is better protected against arbitary
and illegal conduct of the government than he is in England. Note
similar defense in Munro, Governments of Europe, pp. 534-47. Com-
pare also Marriot, The Mechanism of the Modern Sitate (1927), Vol. 2,
pp. 273 ff.; Allen, "Bureaucracy Triumphant," Quarterly Review, Vol.
240 (1923), p. 247; and Barker, "The Rule of Law," Political Science
Quarterly, May, 1914, pp. 117 if.
"The development of a distinctive law is in process. Administra-
tive law has ceased to'be descriptive of an exotic." Frankfurter and
Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1929), pp. 184-186; W. F.
Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration (1929), pp. 20-21;
Elihu Root, Report, American Bar Association (1916), pp. 368-369.
" Roscoe Pound, "Justice According to Law," Columbia Law Re-
view (1907), Vol. 13, p. 696: "Our government was one of laws and
not of men. Administration had become 'only a very subordinate
agency in the whole process of government'. Complete elimination
of the personal in all matters affecting the life, liberty, property or
fortune of the citizens seemed to have been attained. What in other
lands was committed to administration and inspection and executive
supervision, we left to the courts. We were adverse to inspection and
supervision in advance of action, preferring to show the individual his
duty by a general law, to leave him free to act according to his judg-
ment, and to prosecute him and impose the predetermined penalty
in case his free action infringed the law. It was fundamental in our
policy to confine administration to the inevitable minimum. In other
words, where some peoples went to one extreme and were bureau-
ridden, we went to the other extreme and were law-ridden. .
Obviously it threw a great burden upon the judicial system, and de-
spite the reaction which had taken place, will continue to put a
strain upon the courts for a long time to come. . . . Nothing is so
characteristic of the American public law of the last half of the nine-
teenth century as the completeness with which executive action is
tied down by legal liability and judicial review." Roscoe Pound,
"Organization of the Courts," Journ. Amer. Jud. Hoc. (1927), pp. 69-70.
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in form and practice may be expected as we gather more ex-
perience in this field.5 3 Indeed some observers are of the opin-
ion that it will be necessary to create a system of special
courts54 similar in character to the French administrative
courts,55 whose work has been so favorably received. 56  Sooner
P"It is important," says Walter F. Dodd, "that proper methods be
established for the judicial review of decisions of such bodies. Admin-
istrative tribunals may perhaps be most effectively organized as sub-
ordinate agencies in the judicial organization if the courts come to be
organized in such a way to do their work effectively. In rate making
today, one of chief difficulties is that administrative bodies and courts
act in substantially complete independence of each other. The utility
commission investigates and fixes rates; the court, by independent
methods, reaches a different conclusion and annuls the action of the
commission. See Mctardle v. Idianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400
(1926). For this reason efforts have been made in Virginia and Okla-
homa to make the highest state court an agency in rate-making rather
than a mere reversing body. (See pp. 68, 91.) But no steps have yet
been taken to work out satisfactorily arrangements between the state
rate-fixing agencies and the federal courts." State Government (1929),
p. 341. A very interesting and instructive discussion of the problems
of judicial review and administrative adjudication is found in Recent
Social Trends in the United States (1933), Vol 2, pp. 1467-1468.
"William D. Guthrie, "President's Address, New York State Bar
Association," Reports, N. Y. State Bar Assoc. (1923), XLVI, 169;
League of Nation's and Miscellaneous Addresses, 352. "The need for
a coherent system of administrative law, for uniformity and dispatch
in adjudication, for the subtle skill required in judges called upon to
synthesize the public and private claims peculiarly involved in ad-
ministrative litigation, these and kindred considerations will have to
be balanced against the traditional hold of a single system of courts,
giving a generalized professional aptitude to its judges and bringing to
the review of administrative conduct a technique and temperament
trained in litigation between private individuals." Frankfurter and
Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court, 1927, p. 186.
wThe principal administrative courts in France are the interde-
partmental councils of the prefecture and the Council of State. There
are twenty-two departmental councils of the prefecture, each serving
from two to seven departments. In addition, the Department of the
Seine, has a council of its own. Each interdepartmental council con-
sists of a president and four councilors. These councils hear com-
plaints made by individuals against the actions of subordinate officials.
They deal with controversies concerning tax assessments and most of
the matters which come before them are of this nature. They also
have jurisdiction over questions relating to public works (especially
highways) and the conduct of local elections. Procedure in these
courts is simple and economical. Parallel with the interdepartmental
councils of the prefecture are various special administrative courts,
notably the educational councils and councils of revision. Appeals
from these lower administrative courts are taken to the Council of
State. This is a large body, made up of two elements, political and
non-political. Questions of administrative law are heard and deter-
mined by a section of the Council which consists of thirty-five non-
political members, or conselllers en service ordinaire, as they are
called. This group includes many distinguished jurists. Every year
several thousands of cases are decided by this tribunal at a minimum
expenditure of time and money for the litigant. It has been success-
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or later, it is evident, these new forms of legal control through
law administering agencies will have to be adjusted, in one way
or another, to our traditional system of judicial justice.
57
Other factors which tend to withdraw certain classes of
cases from our traditional litigative procedure are to be found
in the movement to adopt conciliation and small claim courts
and to employ arbitration for the settlement of commercial
disputes. Here again the emphasis is on prompt and inexpen-
sive findings, unhampered by technical rules of evidence. Con-
ciliation offers a means of friendly adjustment to parties whose
interests clash and places emphasis on equity rather than the
strict letter of the law.5 8 Indeed the discretionary element is
important in both the conciliation and small claims court. The
judge is the key figure in both. The success or failure of a con-
ciliation court depends very largely upon the man who acts as
conciliator.5 9 In the small claims court, the same thing is true,
ful and enjoys the respect of the French people. Munro, Governments
of Europe (1931), pp. 543-544.
" Jameh W. Garner says: "It can now be said without possibility
of contradiction that there is no country in which the rights of private
individuals are so well protected against the arbitrariness, the abuses,
and the illegal conduct of the administrative authorities, and where
the people are so sure of receiving reparation for injuries sustained
on account of such conduct." "French Administrative Law," Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 32, p. 599, April, 1924.
51 "In any merger, and in developments in that direction, there
is nothing to compel a giving up of the use by administrative tribunals
of investigators, impartial physicians, simple procedure, simple forms,
mail service, and the automatic settlement of claims. If they interfere
with parts of the traditional machinery, such parts ought to be
scrapped. Administrative tribunals have much to teach judisial
tribunals about promptness, inexpensiveness, and limiting the attorney
to clearly defined functions." R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor, p. 91.
"Professor John H. Wigmore in discussing some aspects of con-
ciliation for the American Judicature Society said: "The rules of
technical substantive law defining In detailed logic the parties' rights
and obligations, are either Ignored or modified or roughly followed, as
each case may seem to require, in the judge's opinion of the ethical
merits of the whole case." Continuing he says: "Taking first the
law of substantive rights and obligations, it signifies that there Is a
place, at some point, where its mass of technical details is not needed
. . . Here we face the old problem, perennially discussed by the
philosophers of the distinction between law and justice . . . Law
protects us against the incompetence, whimsicality, corruption and
variability of the human judge, among thousands of whom will be
few who are wise and sound enough to do justice. And Justice Is
theoretically superior to law, in that it represents the wise and just
solution which uniform rules cannot expect to attain in each indi-
vidual case." Am. Jud. Hoc., Bull. 7fII.
5 Judge H. H. Sawyer who established the Conciliation Court In
Des Moines, Iowa, explains why the success of conciliation depends on
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since the judge is in affirmative control of the whole proceed-
ings. He is equipped not only to prevent injustice but to do
justice. If he does not accomplish this purpose, thle responsi-
bility rests with him s0
In arbitration the emphasis is also placed on the speedy,
economical and final settlement of disputes.6 1 For years Eng-
land has had a system of arbitration as an integral part of its
judicial system, which has proved very effective.6 2 In 1920, the
the conciliator in "Making Justice Less Expensive," The American
Mercury, July, 1928, Vol. 14, pp. 304-312. To be successful, he says,
the conciliator "must be one who believes thoroughly in conciliation,
he must also have almost unlimited patience, and he must have the
knack of bringing waning parties together. It is a peculiar and some-
what difficult position to fill. The success of the Cleveland Court is
largely due to the clerk who started it and who acted as conciliator
until his death about a year ago. Almost as much can be said of the
Minneapolis Court. Many other courts have failed of complete suc-
cess because they have not found the right men for conciliators," p. 310;
F. R. Aumann, "The Des Moines Conciliation Court," Journal of the
American Judicature Society, Vol. XI, June, 1928.
* "More important, in the small claim courts, the judges have
won back their proper and rightful power and influence which has
been so badly curtailed in our state tribunals. The small claims court
judge Is not an umpire, he is an impartial investigator into the truth.
He is not a passive agent waiting for objections, he is in affirmative
control of the whole proceedings. It has long been recognized as an
anomaly that judges sitting without juries should be thrust into the
straight-jacket of the rules ofevidence which exist solely for the pro-
tection and guidance of lay juries. In the small claims court the judge
Iq not shackled, he is not obliged to sit by in impatience while, as
Thayer has said, 'the rules of evidence are sharply and technically
used to worry an inexperienced, or ill-equipped adversary in order to
support a worthless case.' He is equipped and empowered not only to
prevent injustice but to do justice. The small claims courts are sound.
They demonstrate what our judges can do, and will do, if they are
given the needed power and responsibility." "Report of the Committee
on Small Claims and Concilation Procedure of the Conference of Bar
Association Delegates," 1923, Amer. Bar Association Journal, Novem-
ber, 1924.
61W. A. Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards, Kansas
City, Missouri, 1930; W. IF. Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Admin-
istration (1929), pp. 53-79; F. R. Aumann, "The Lawyer and His
Troubles," North American Review, April, 1933, pp. 310-318.
63"A very large proportion of all business disputes of England
never come into the courts at all, but are adjusted by tribunals estab-
lished within the various trade associations and exchanges. This is
especially true of the vast wholesale distributing trades which are
responsible for a great part of the immense volume of imports and
exports constantly flowing through the ports of England and giving
them the commanding position they occupy towards the sea-borne trade
of the world. Disputes over the quality and condition of consignments
of grain, cotton, sugar, coffee, fruit, rubber, timber, meats, hides, seeds,
fibers, fats, and countless other articles of commerce, as well as every
conceivable variety of dispute can arise out of contract for sale and
delivery, such as questions of delays, quantities, freights, interpreta-
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first law to give legal force to arbitration agreements was
passed by New York State. 3 This act made agreements to
arbitrate irrevocable. Since then laws of much the same char-
acter have been passed by New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachu-
setts, California, Oregon, Louisiana, Connecticut, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island and Arizona, while all the other states have
passed some form of arbitration law, as has the federal govern-
ment.6 4 The arbitration movement was greatly stimulated by
the establishment of the American Arbitration Association in
1926. Where arbitration is used, the courts are displaced;
another victory is won for flexible procedure; and another de-
feat ensues for rules and formal procedure.
65
Significant developments affecting our traditional forms of
organization and procedure have also taken place in the develop-
ments of our juvenile and domestic relations courts. In the
juvenile court much of the evidence used is taken from out-
side of the court by court officials and is based in great part on
the sciences of human behaviour,66 plus the observations of
tion, etc.-all these are passed upon by business arbitrators selected
by reason of their familiarity with the customs of the trade and with
the technical facts involved, and not submitted to juries whose igno-
rahce would usually be equally comprehensive." Samuel Rosenbaum,
"Report on Commercial Arbitration in England," American Judicature
Societl, Bulletin X1, October, 1916.
63"At common law, agreements for the submission of disputed
matters to unofficial arbitrators for settlement were not fostered since
the courts were jealous of anything tending to oust them of their
jurisdiction. This hostility prevented the specific enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements and made such agreements in effect revocable by
permitting resort to the law courts by either party. Early statutes
were only of a regulatory nature but by 1920 the movement toward
arbitration had gained great impetus due largely to the activities of
trade associations and chambers of commerce. These organizations
then began to incorporate future disputes clauses into their articles
of membership and by-laws and standard contract form, a practice
which had been adopted by over 150 of them by 1931." Recent Social
Trends in the United States, 1933, Vol. II, pp. 1454-1455.
"Statutes providing for specific enforcement of irrevocable con-
tracts to arbitrate future as well as present statutes were in effect in
eleven states, the territory of Hawaii, and in the federal jurisdiction
by 1933. They have been held constitutional as against charges that
they were destroying the right of trial by jury and were diminish-
ing the jurisdiction of the courts.
05 American Bar Association Journal, 1930, Vol. 16, pp. 699, 805.
O'Roscoe Pound speaking in this connection said: "The funda-
mental theory of our orthodox criminal law has gone down before
modern psychology and psychopathology. The results are only begin-
ning to be felt." Page 588, "Criminal Justice in Cleveland," The CTleve-
land Foundation (1922). "Scientific diagnostic study as a regular serv-
ice for delinquents and for a court began in the juvenile court in
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trained workers.67 This is quite different from the orthodox
method, wlere evidence is presented and arguments are made
by opposing attorneys before a judge who decides each case
according to established principles on the legally admissible
evidence of the witnesses. 8 The tendency in the juvenile court
is towards a more human emphasis, and requires a more lib-
eral procedure in transacting the business of the courts.6 9 In
the course of time this procedure may affect other courts as
wello 0
The methods and organization of domestic relations courts
are also of interest.7 ' Viewed from some angles, they have
Chicago in 1909. This work which was started and continued under
the name of the Juvenile Psycopathie Institute, was soon perceived to
have much wider bearings and usefulness than study of merely psyco-
pathic cases; the cases of quite normal offenders often justify as much,
if not more attention given them for the sake of effective understand-
ings." William Healey, "The Practical Value of Scientific Study of
Juvenile Delinquents," United States (hildreW's Bureau Publication,
No. 96 (1922), p. 7. For further discussion on this subject see A. L.
Jacoby, "The Psycopathic Clinic in a Criminal Court: Its Use and Pos-
sibilities," Am. Jud. Soc. Journ., Vol. 7, June, 1923, pp. 21, 25; Harry
Olson, "Crime and Heredity," Am. Jud. Soc. Journ., Vol. 7, August,
1923, pp. 33, 77.
OlThe probation officer assumes an important role in this process.
Thomas D. Elliot, "The Juvenile Court and the Educational System,"
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.
SGenerally speaking certain features are considered essential for
the organization of the juvenile court. These features include (1)
Separate hearings for children's cases; (2) Informal or chancery
procedure, excluding the use of petition or summons; (3) Regular
probation service, both for supervisory care and investigation; (4) De-
tention separate for adults; (5) Special courts and probation records,
both legal and social; (6) Provisions for mental and physical ex-
amination.
lWhen a court is acting, not as an arbiter of private strife but
as the medium of the State's performance of its sovereign duties as
parens patriae and promoter of the general welfare, it is natural that
some of the safeguards of judicial contests should be laid aside."
Edward F. Waite, "How Far Can Court Procedure be Socialized With-
out Impairing Individual Rights?" p. 55, U. S. Ohilren?'s Bureau Paub-
lications, No. 97 (1922). See further in this connection, Miriam Van
Waters, "The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedure," p. 64, U. S.
Ohildren's Bureau Publications, No. 97 (1922). For further comments
on this subject, see p. 62, ibid.
" "Today the vanguard of thought is recognizing that many of the
principles of socialized treatment-such as a study of the character-
istics of the individual and the environment in which he lives and
constructive probation-are applicable and should be extended grad-
ually to the whole field of criminal justice." Page 13, "The Child, the
Family and the Court," U. H. Chi dre's Bureau Publications, No. 193
(1929). In this connection, see W. A. White, "Judicial versus Admin-
istrative Process at the Prosecution Stage," Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 851-858 (March-April, 1935).Charles Zunser, "The Domestic Relations Court," Annals of th
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more the character of an administrative than a judicial agency.
They differ from most other administrative agencies, however,
in that they put their orders in the form of a judicial decree
when necessary, with all the powers of the judicial process to
enforce that decree. In performing its functions a large dis-
cretion is vested in this type of court to fit its decree to tho in-
dividual case. It is assisted in this procedure by its perma-
nent staff of trained workers who investigate each case person-
ally and supervise the carrying out of the decree. Formalities
in bringing action, producing evidence, and conducting pro-
ceedings are not present here.72
Indeed some experienced observers believe the "domestic
relations" court should be frankly looked upon as a social
agency rather than an agency to enforce criminal law or decide
technical controversies between litigants.78 An ideal court of
this kind, they believe, would have a jurisdiction, sufficiently
wide to cover all cases, civil and criminal, affecting the child
and domestic relations. It would be presided over by a judge
holding office permanently. He would be selected with a view
to his special qualifications for the office. Hearings would be
informal;74 probation would be an important factor;75 phys-
ical and mental examinations would be required of all children
Amer. Acad. of PoL and Zoc. Sci., Vol. 124, March, 1926; Charles W.
Hoffman, "Courts of Domestic Relations," Proc. of Natl. Conf. of Hoc.
Work (1918), pp. 124-128; "Development in Family Court Work,"
Proc. of Natl. Prob. Assn., pp. 55-58; "The Organization of Domestic
Relations Courts," Proc. Natl. Prob. Assn. (1928), pp. 145-151.
'The work being done in the Domestic Relations Court of Cin-
cinnati aptly illustrates recent developments in this field. Much of its
work consists in supervising probation of children. In arriving at its
decrees the court employs techniques which would seem strangely
out of place in the orthodox form of court. It has drawn heavily upon
the tools that modern scientific knowledge places at its disposal. In
consequence social investigation and medical examination play a
prominent part in its work. See Alan Johnstone, "The Domestic Rela-
tions Court of Cincinnati, Ohio," Baltimore Criminal Justice Commis-
sion, mimeographed manuscript, 1924.
3 See Edward F. Waite, "Courts of Domestic Relations," Minne-
sota Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Feb., 1921), p. 167, quoting Judge
Harry A. Fisher of the Buffalo Domestic Relations Court.
'All technical rules of evidence would be eliminated. Hearings
would be apart from proceedings in other branches of the court and
the public excluded.
"An adequate force of capable probation officers would be required
to help the judge in cases coming befQre him by making personal In-
vestigations. They would also supervise those placed on probation
under the controlling direction of the judge.
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appearing before the court;76 a close relationship with organ-
ized social agencies would be maintained; and the social data
developed by the courts' proceedings would be carefully re-
corded and preserved.
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In conclusion it may be said that the legal system,like the
social system of which it is a part is straining at its moorings.
In a period of rapid social change it repeats its history of the
past and enters into a period of executive justice. This trend
is reflected in a critical movement in legal philosophy which
challenges ancient concepts and demands that the relationship
of law to modern society be re-examined with care and pre-
cision to the end that law will be more useful socially. It is
discernible also in the movement to widen the range of judicial
discretion, to the end that the law may more easily adjust itself
to a changed social condition; and in the several movements
which are re-arranging our forms of court organization and
procedure to the end that they will be more flexible and work-
able in a complex modern world. It shows itself further in a
new attitude to the legal order and its traditional set of values,
such as separation of powers in government, the supremacy of
an independent judiciary, proof of every allegation according
to time tried rules of evidence, testing each witness by cross-
examination, deliberation, jury trial, and appeal. In times past,
these rights were highly prized. Today, the public has little
patience with them and their delay, technicalities and costs.1 8
It is more interested in economy and flexibility. In conse-
quence, it turns more and more to a system of executive justice,
which, can operate quickly, economically and free from proced-
ural formality.
'Judge Chas. W. Hoffman, "Why the Family Court Needs a
Psychopathic Laboratory," Proceedings of the American Prison As-
Bociation (1916), pp. 61-70.
"W. F. Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration (1929),
pp. 333-34; U. S. Children's Bureau Publications (1929), No. 193,
pp. 49-52.
"Robert Jackson, "An Organized American Bar," American Bar
Asociation Journal, June, 1932, Vol. 18, p. 384.
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